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Point by point, ex-analyst details case against general

By David Zucchino

NEW YORK — Dissecting point by point a litany of allegations made in a disputed CBS documentary, former CIA analyst Sam Adams detailed to a jury yesterday why he believed Gen. William C. Westmoreland had engaged in a "deception" in Vietnam.

Often gesturing to make a point as he spoke directly to the jurors, Adams said he was "proud" to have been associated with a documentary that has made him a defendant in the libel suit. Research by Adams formed the basis of the 1982 broadcast, for which Westmoreland has sued CBS, Adams and two other people for \$120 million.

Westmoreland, occasionally grinning disdainfully, watched from the plaintiff's table as Adams expounded on virtually every significant charge made in the broadcast. As the documentary was shown on videotape to the jury, Adams explained section after section of it to the jury, citing his years of interviews and his own personal experience.

It was the first time in the 14-week trial that the jury had seen the entire broadcast. Westmoreland's attorneys have played each of the program's five segments separately, but not the documentary as a whole.

Yesterday was Adams' second day on the stand for questioning by an attorney for CBS. During that time the attorney, David Boies, attempted to convince the jury of the depth and accuracy of Adams' research and memory. Adams, a paid consultant for the broadcast, provided CBS with secret documents on Vietnam intelligence, and led the network to former intelligence officers who confirmed his charges.

The broadcast, The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception, accused Westmoreland of engaging in a "conspiracy" in 1967 and 1968 to "deceive" his superiors by minimizing estimates of enemy strength.

Again and again yesterday, Boies interrupted the playing of the broadcast to ask Adams whether he believed before the program aired that a particular allegation was true. Each time, Adams replied gravely, "Yes sir, I did."

Asked repeatedly to explain the "basis" for his beliefs, Adams gave long, minutely detailed reconstructions of his own participation in

events of 1967 and 1968 in Washington and Vietnam analyzing intelligence documents, and of subsequent interviews with dozens of former CIA and military intelligence analysts from the period. He repeatedly cited specific dates and quoted conversations verbatim, often reminding jurors of when particular offi-

cers had been promoted from colonel to general. "I was there when it happened," he reminded the jury at one point.

At another point, he quoted a former intelligence officer under Westmoreland as confessing to him in 1976 that he had followed orders to "cook the books" on enemy estimates: "We were wrong, Sam. It's been on my conscience for years."

Adams, who will be cross-examined tomorrow, also told the jurors that the research he conducted between 1966 and 1982 included more than 200 interviews and dozens of government documents.

His research and his own experience as a CIA analyst on Vietnam from 1966 to 1968 convinced him, he said, that U.S. soldiers "were being killed while we were playing with numbers." He said some of Westmoreland's own intelligence officers, as well as many of Adams' fellow CIA analysts, believed total enemy strength was as high as 600,000—double the 300,000 reported by Westmoreland's command.

Finally, Just as Westmoreland had concluded his own testimony with an impassioned soliloquy defending his conduct, Adams ended with an emotional defense of the broadcast and of his own long campaign to prove a "monument of deceit" by Westmoreland's command.

Leaning forward and speaking loudly but slowly, Adams then described a visit he made last year to the Vietnam memorial in Washington, D.C. He said he had asked himself how many of the 45,000 U.S. soldiers who died in Vietnam combat—out of what he said were 53,022 total deaths—whose names were engraved on the granite memorial had

been-killed by enemy irregulars who Westmoreland has said posed no military threat.

The broadcast accused Westmoreland of dropping those irregulars from official estimates of enemy strength in order to keep the estimates under an arbitrary "ceiling" of 300,000 he had imposed on his own intelligence officers. The disputed deceit by Westmoreland's command, both Adams and the broadcast have contended, exposed U.S. troops to added dangers.

Based on his research, Adams said, he concluded at the memorial that perhaps one-third to one-half of the 45,000 casualties had been killed by bombs and booby-traps planted by the irregulars. "When intelligence has failed that badly," Adams concluded, "what failed ought to be brought to light ... so that we don't repeat the same inistakes."

Moments earlier, Boies asked Adams whether he had any regrets about participating in the broadcast. He replied: "None whatsoever. I have no regrets because I think it accurately reflected what went on" in Vietnam. He added: "I am proud to have been part of the broadcast."

Asked whether he would still join the CIA if he "had it all to do over," Adams smiled and said: "Yep."

Asked whether he was satisfied with the broadcast when it aired in January 1982, Adams responded: "I was satisfied, first, as to its accuracy. I was satisfied in the sense that it had portrayed accurately in my view what I thought was the massive falsification of statistics" by Westmoreland's command.

He added: "We in intelligence, I thought, had tried to fool the American public. We tried to fool the Congress, and even to some extent the [Johnson] administration, but we ended-up, I think, in fooling ourselves. I thought that the broadcast came to explain at least in part how we had managed to lose this war."

Adams, 51, testified that he had become so convinced of Westmoreland's "deceit" that he asked the Army inspector general to court-martial him in 1973. When he resigned from the CIA the same year, he added, he took photocopies of scores of CIA documents, burying some of them on his Virginia farm.

Asked by Boies why he had taken the documents, Adams replied: "I thought I had witnessed what I considered ... certainly the biggest scandal in military intelligence, American intelligence, that I was aware of. And I was frightened. I was scared that perhaps this kind of record might disappear, and I wanted to preserve the evidence."